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The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order-Princi.
ples of Content and Procedure. MYRis S. McDouGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, AND JAMES C. MILLER. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press. 1967. Pp. xxi, 410. $9.75.
The basic purpose of this book appears to be to provide a critical
appraisal of the traditional methods of interpreting international agree-
ments and to suggest a new approach. In their Introduction the authors
advocate utilization of modern developments in "communications
analysis" -"one of the most rapidly expanding fields in the modern
social, behavioral, and engineering sciences," involving linguistics,
symbolic logic, mathematics, and "extensive empirical research on the
role of communicative activities in social process." 1 Although the study
deals primarily with the interpretation of treaties, the authors believe
that "the task of interpretation would appear to be fundamentally the
same for all types of prescriptions-international agreements, consti-
tutions, statutes, precedents, and customary prescriptions-and even
for private agreements." 2
Thus stated, the intention of the draftsmen of this treatise is clear;
the words chosen to express their intent appear to have "natural" or
"ordinary" meanings in their context. Unfortunately, what follows
throughout large sections of the book is a linguistic morass in which
the authors have chosen to bury their own powers of communication.
This has compelled them to provide the book with its own (nonaddic-
tive) lexicon and glossary on "use of terms" (like those treaties that
commence: "As the terms are used in this convention . . . .") and has
led them to reformulate in their own jargon a modern set of canons
of interpretation. Possibly one hundred pages are squandered on this
dogmatic scientism.
The table of contents and the rubrics employed as titles and sub-
titles achieve an elevated level of abstraction. Who could guess that the
heading, "Trends in the Management of Principles of Content-The
Contextuality Principle-Preliminary Events," would lead to a dis-
cussion of the desirability of early resort to travaux preparatoires in the
interpretation of treaties? Similarly, judicial notice and iura curia
novit are briefly noted under the rubric "Outcomes-The Principle




The "sounds comprising the words of language systems," the
reader is told, are signs. The subjective events called up by signs are
symbols, often referred to as "interpretations." "Objectives sought by
participants in a forum" are often "highly explicit subjective events."
"Strategic expectations" guide "communicators" seeking to modify the
"resource environment."3 Base values are "inventoried" as "wealth,
power, rectitude, affection, respect, enlightenment, skill, well-being, "4
and there are check-lists within check-lists (participants, objectives,
situations, base values, strategies, outcomes, post-outcomes) 5 to tell the
judge how to think systematically about the interpretative process.
What is the text of a treaty? Apparently only the "outcome phase
-that denoting the parties' final commitment upon the projection
of a future policy" where the parties are "optimally alert to their total
value position." Despite this implicit recognition of the importance
of an agreed text, the authors deliberately put the cart before the
horse by rejecting both the view of Charles Cheney Hyde that "[i]t
is the contract which is the subject of interpretation, rather than the
volition of the parties"7 and the conclusion of the International Law
Commission that "the starting point of interpretation is the elucida-
tion of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the
intentions of the parties" as "a subjective element distinct from the
text."8
Contemning the Commission's view as an "arbitrary presump-
tion,"9 the authors believe that the beginning and end of treaty inter-
pretation is to discover "the genuine shared expectations of the par-
ticular parties." This incantation-repeated by the authors fifty times,
and, with variants, over one hundred times-is designed to exorcise
traditional methods of interpretation characterized by the authors as
"lamentable."'u Judge Charles De Visscher, in his wise and illumi-
nating book, Problames d'Interpretation Judiciaire en Droit Interna-
tional Public," points out that the doctrinal position that the inter-
preter should first seek the intention of the parties is a source of
3 Pp. xi-xiii.
4 P. xiv.
5 See Table of Contents & pp. 15-34, 44-65.
6 P. 58.
7 P. 93, quoting 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1471 (2d ed. 1945).
8 P. 88. See Commentary to Article 27, International Law Comm'n, Report, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 9, at 51, 49, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966).
9 P. 88.
10 p. 360.
11 At 50 (1963).
[Vol. 53:543
BOOK REVIEWS
confusion; discovery of that intention is the goal and the result of the
interpretative process, not an independent criterion initially appli-
cable. The interpreter can only commence with the text in which the
parties record their agreement.
The distaste exhibited by the authors for what they regard as a
narrow textual approach is understandable because of its abuse in the
past. They are properly critical of the view that words can have
"plain," "natural," or "ordinary" meanings divorced from their con-
text. They scathingly reject the hoary canon of interpretation of Vattel
that "it is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpreta-
tion" on the ground that this is in itself an interpretation. They care-
fully examine other contradictory canons, such as in dubio mitius (in
case of doubt, adopt the interpretation least onerous on a party) and
ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather have effect
than be destroyed-sometimes called "the principle of effectiveness"
or "liberal interpretation"), and skillfully fit them into their over-
riding criterion of "the genuine shared expectations of the particular
parties." International lawyers will find most useful the authors' crit-
ical appraisals of the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice and its predecessor on the interpretation of treaties.
The most valuable contribution of the authors is their insistence
on the "contextuality principle": nothing that throws light on the
words'3 chosen by the parties to express their "shared expectations"
should be barred to the interpreter. In this connection, they rightly
criticize the 1966 Draft of the International Law Commission, which
unfortunately separates recourse to travaux prparatoires in Article 28,
entitled "Supplementary Means of Interpretation," from Article 27,
labelled "General Rule of Interpretation." Although, in its Commen-
tary, the Commission denies that it has set up a hierarchy of norms of
interpretation, it is to be hoped that the forthcoming Vienna Con-
ference on The Law of Treaties will combine the two articles.
One arrives, then, at considerable agreement with the authors con-
cerning the goal of interpretation. What is regrettable is that they
have dressed up in the guise of modern "communications analysis" a
decrepit and often-challenged view that it is the intention of the parties
(their "genuine shared expectations," "the subjectivities which are im-
portant to shared commitment"'14) which is subject to interpretation,
12 P. 78 et seq.
13 The emphasis is the reviewer's. The extraordinary interest of the authors in
words appears to dissipate itself before reaching the text of a treaty.
14 P. 15 & passim.
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rather than the text of the treaty in which they have objectively ex-
pressed their shared intentions, subjectivities, and agreement.
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